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ABSTRACT
Increased access to space has opened the door to many satellite vendors. These vendors are collecting
data using a variety of sensors, including electro-optical, radio frequency, and synthetic aperture radar.
Customers want true-sourced, authentic data. However, as with any lower barrier to entry, the risk of
counterfeit, tampered, or low-quality products increases. In this work, we describe the key requirements for
trusting imagery and present a hardware design and a system of controls that meet those requirements of
trust for Earth imaging satellites. Our trusted hardware provides assurance of capture time, location, and
preserves the content and origin by capturing and digitally signing the information end users need to make
trust decisions about the data. Our hardware functions as an independent witness that oversees and signs
off on satellite collection activities. Anti-tamper, inspection, and verification measures protect and verify the
secure operation of our hardware. Satellite operators that use this approach in their satellites and operations
will offer their end users greater assurance in the authenticity of the produced satellite imagery products.
INTRODUCTION

chines to detect fake data. Without knowledge of
the original data, it may be very difficult to identify bad data. End users need a means to verify the
origin of satellite imagery and the correctness of its
content and metadata.

Satellite imagery is more available now than ever
before. Increased access to space and improved constellation management are revolutionizing the way
we see the Earth. Service costs are decreasing and
ground coverage and revisit frequencies are increasing. Output image products are used for many objectives, including agricultural management, environmental monitoring, and defense. These eyes in
the sky are feeding decision makers on the ground.
Customers need true-sourced, authentic data. However, as with any lower barrier to entry, the risk
of counterfeit, tampered, or low-quality products increases. As satellite production and operation moves
out of house, end users have less knowledge and
control of the satellite systems and their groundbased components. This separation decreases the
end users’ ability to verify the integrity of the systems that capture, process, and disseminate the
data.

Methods for providing assurance are under development, but none of them offer end-to-end guarantees
of what was seen by a third-party sensor. Cryptography is being used to protect data in flight and
preserve actions performed by trusted and/or semitrusted entities, but by itself cannot validate the output of a third-party remote sensor. Forensic analysis
algorithms can identify some types of image tampering, but this is a cat and mouse game as detectors are
not created until threats are identified. Background
checks of company personnel and accreditation programs for information technology can help, but the
inherent complexity of these systems makes it hard
to know whether a system is truly trustworthy or
not.

Good data can be poisoned through interception by
an adversary or through processing on a tampered
or hacked device. Devices can be impacted through
direct access or through a supply-chain attack. Bad
data can also originate from a simulator, a generative adversarial network (GAN), a replay attack, or
some other means. Even satellite imagery is susceptible to image compromising attacks and new
machine learning-based deepfake geography generators1–3 are making it harder for humans and ma-

While all of these methods have merit, they must
be coupled with an onboard verification mechanism
and end-to-end cryptographic protections, to deliver
the highest assurance to end users. In this work, we
identify the attributes of the image collection process
that must be verified and propose a trusted hardware
architecture for doing so. This trusted hardware
acts as a digital notary public that signs off on the
collection activities of the third-party satellite. Securely deploying trusted hardware on an untrusted
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Figure 1: The lineage of a satellite image
platform poses many challenges. Anti-tamper technology, inspections, and remote verification are all
required. Our intent is for this technology to be implemented, keyed, deployed, and monitored by an
independent trusted party.

in the accuracy and authenticity of satellite imagery,
and will reduce the risk of making critical decisions
with incorrect or out-of-date information.
In addition further security mechanisms must also
be included in a reliable system to ensure the cryptographic integrity of the system is preserved, and
to protect from malicious attackers.

Satellite operators that utilize these principles will
offer true end-to-end assurance of their image products to their end users, regardless of company or
government affiliation. We are preparing a hardware
prototype to fly and remotely verify on the International Space Station early next year.

Threat Summary
Each stage of the data processing pipeline is subject
to a variety of threats that may impact the accuracy
and usability of the final product. Without mitigation, there is an increasing risk that counterfeit or
modified data will appear. It is our observation that
it is harder for intruders to gain access to the systems and components further upstream than it is
for them to access those systems on the ground and
closer to the user. Here is a summary of some potential attacks.

PROBLEM STATEMENT
Satellite imagery collection and dissemination processes involve several systems and components as
depicted in Figure 1. The start is when a physical object emits photons, which propagate up and
through the satellite lens onto the focal plane array
(FPA). The FPA transforms the signal into a digital frame and delivers it to an onboard processor.
The onboard processor may perform some enhancement or correction and then it packages the data for
downlink. When the data is received at the ground
station it may undergo processing. Only after that
processing is completed is the imagery then delivered
to the end user.

There are multiple opportunities to replace or modify the imagery data after it is downlinked from the
satellite. At this stage, during ground processing
or dissemination, there is no way for the end user to
know whether or not the image has been modified or
replaced. To insert false data at this stage, an attack
could fabricate new satellite imagery or modify existing imagery to create new data, and deliver that
to the end user. Powerful image editing tools and
deepfake models can produce an image that is nearly
indistinguishable from an authentic image. This replacement or modification can be accomplished by
compromising the downlink, the ground processing,
or the dissemination mechanism.

In this process, different components of this data
path may be owned/managed by different entities or
organizations. Current methods require each stage
of the data pipeline to blindly trust that the previous or following stages did not maliciously modify the data, utilizing only error correction codes
to ensure data is not corrupted accidentally. Additional protections should be implemented to more
effectively secure image data, and give the end user
higher assurance that the data received has not been
tampered with. Adding cryptographic signatures to
data at the time of creation will increase confidence
Crosby

To compromise the image earlier in the data
pipeline, an adversary would need to somehow compromise the space vehicle itself. This would require
physical access to the system, or a modification of
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the hardware/software being designed and deployed.
While less likely, as many space vehicles are joint efforts, it still represents a threat to the design. An
attacker could attempt to compromise the security
of the focal plane array or on-board processing by
replacing or modifying the device during system integration.

tal signatures, digital watermarks, forensic analysis,
and so forth.4 Forensic analysis is a continual catand-mouse game between attackers and defenders5
does not provide the level of assurance we desire.
For this reason, we chose to focus on cryptographic
methods for establishing image authenticity.
Authenticated cameras produce imagery where the
content and source can be verified. These cameras
were conceived many years ago.6, 7 Researchers have
developed cameras that use Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) with embedded Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), to digitally sign imagery
with asymmetric keys as it is captured.8 Our focus
is in adapting authenticated camera technology to a
space environment.

Obviously, an adversary can also protect a physical object from being imaged by simply obscuring
it from view so it can’t be seen from orbit. This
is only possible with small and/or portable objects,
and isn’t particularly feasible as the adversary rarely
knows precisely when an image will be collected.
In addition, once cryptographic signatures have been
added to the pipeline, they also present an attack
surface to a potential adversary. It is essential to
protect the integrity of the device by ensuring that
the secret key is sufficiently protected, and verifying
that the device implementing these security features
has not been compromised. If these protections fail,
an adversary could use the device or the secret key
to sign invalid or modified data.

Several organizations are working to establish standards and means for enabling authentication of
imagery9–12 for combating disinformation. The
Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA)9 is standardizing approaches for securely
establishing the pedigree of multimedia. The basic premise is to compute a digital signature when
the image is created, and then when the multimedia is updated, the changes are added to the history and the multimedia is re-signed by the editor.
Downstream users can then verify that the data was
created and edited by the said parties and that no
changes were made elsewhere. The C2PA specification does not try to establish that the provenance
data is ’true’, but enables verification of its association with the asset, correct formation, and tamperfree status.13 We take this approach one step further
by sourcing the original data from a trusted source.

Risks
There is a fundamental integrity risk in using imagery collected by third-party remote sensors as it
is difficult to determine whether the integrity of an
image has been compromised. The components of
third-party remote sensing platforms and ground
stations are untrusted by the end user, and it is
very difficult to verify the authenticity of the imagery, as third party companies will commonly use
proprietary algorithms to process their data.

Another approach for ensuring third-party correctness is to investigate the third-party’s infrastructure
and establishment. For example, Kinser et al. proposed a methodology for establishing cyber trust
scores for space enterprises.14 While these accreditation processes are good, there can be a gap between
perceived state and actual implementation.

The use of satellite imagery as input data for decision makers and algorithms has become ubiquitous
in the 21st century. The cost of using data that is
incorrect is difficult to quantify. In some cases the
risk can be small, such as inaccuracies in the in-game
map for Microsoft Flight Simulator. In many cases
however, inaccurate data could result in loss of life.
Militaries rely on this data for training and deployment. Autonomous car companies rely on this data
for navigation. This data is used to track forest conditions to estimate risk of wildfires. In these cases
and more, increased trust in an images authenticity
reduces risk.

APPROACH
In this section, we discuss the requirements for trusting an image and propose an architecture1 and complimentary routines for meeting those requirements
in remote sensing applications.

RELATED WORK

Requirements for Trusting Imagery

Researchers have proposed many methods for ensuring or checking image authenticity, including digi-

An end user can only trust an image if the user trusts
the image origin, has assurance of the time and loca-

1 Our
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approach to creating authenticated imagery for remote sensing applications is patent pending
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tion of the capture, and has assurance that the image and its corresponding metadata were not modified by an unauthorized party (See Figure 2). Here
we build upon the early work by Kelsey, Schneier,
and Hall6 to define six requirements for trusting an
image.

of the resulting image must be known. Associating
an image with a specific piece of hardware connects
the image with the organization that is operating the
hardware. This requirement is not met if the imaging hardware can be cloned or if another device can
produce an image that appears to have come from
the listed source.

View

Trust Requirement 6 (Content) The content
and any associated metadata of the resulting image
must be authentic and free from any unauthorized
modifications. An undetected change can fully compromise an image.

Orientation
Origin
Time

When all of these requirements are met, end users
are able to have greater trust in the authenticity of
an image. If one or more of the requirements are not
met, then additional measures should be taken, such
as using forensic analysis tools for identifying tampering. While later measures are helpful, they may
not offer the same assurance as meeting the trust
requirements.

Location
Content

Figure 2: Six attributes of image capture that
must be trustworthy
Trust Requirement 1 (Time) The provided capture time must be trustworthy. Without a well
founded timestamp, the image could be incorrectly
associated with the wrong time, as is the case with
a replay attack.

Authenticated Imagery for Remote Sensing
While meeting these requirements in a controlled environment on the Earth is possible using existing
authenticated camera technology, meeting these requirements for an imaging satellite in space brings
additional challenges. When the satellite is built,
owned, and operated by an untrusted or semitrusted third party, additional measures are required.

Trust Requirement 2 (Location) The provided
capture location must be trustworthy. This includes
the location of the imaging sensor and geospatial
or other location information associated with the
scene. Without verified location information, the
image could be incorrectly associated with another
location.

In the remainder of this section, we lay out our approach to meeting the trust requirements for imaging
satellites. While our approach is suitable for thirdparty satellites, it offers benefits to satellites built
and operated in-house.

Trust Requirement 3 (Orientation) The provided orientation of the imaging sensor must be
trustworthy. The orientation of the imaging sensor
provides important perspective information, particularly in the case when only sensor location information is available. An image without orientation
information could be incorrectly associated with the
wrong scene.

Our approach to meeting these requirements is to
employ trusted hardware, inspections, and verification routines. A trusted witness is needed to sign
off on the collection of an image. This is analogous
to a notary public that would observe a client taking a photo and then notarize the resulting image.
We describe this Trusted Signing Hardware below.
As hardware is vulnerable to attack, we propose inspection routines to keep the hardware safe prior to
launch into orbit. This is analogous to a notary public going through an exam and a background check
prior to receiving a commission. Once deployed, routine verification tests of the Trusted Signing Hardware is required. Continuing the analogy of the notary public, these verification routines are the random reviews of a notary’s journal records.

Trust Requirement 4 (View) The view of the
imaging sensor must be real and unobstructed.
Blocking an image sensor or feeding in a fabricated
scene can circumvent all other security controls. Images should be free from staging or other in front
of the lens manipulations. Unauthorized staging is
a risk whenever the operator of the imaging sensor
does not control every aspect of the scene, which is
always the case in remote sensing.
Trust Requirement 5 (Origin) The true origin
Crosby
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Figure 3: Independent trusted hardware signs the data immediately after capture. Any end
user with the public key can verify the data.
The organization that builds the trusted hardware
and performs inspections and verification should be
trusted by both the satellite operator and the end
user. Having an organization that is independent
from the satellite operator can lower the chances of
insider threat. One option is to utilize a third-party
standards laboratory.

tation information. In our design we use an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) to capture the payload orientation and to show that the payload is in
a space environment. After the digital signature is
computed, the image and the signature (either separately or together). At that point, the image and
signature can be downlinked by the untrusted satellite and distributed by untrusted distribution networks. End users with the appropriate encryption
certificate can verify the origin and content of the
image by checking the digital signature. This design
is depicted in Figure 4.

Trusted Signing Hardware
A typical authenticated camera produces imagery
where the origin and content can be verified. This is
performed by capturing the image and related metadata (including time and location) and then encrypting or signing the data in some fashion using encryption keys. If using asymmetric encryption, the
public keys can be widely distributed and anybody
with the public key can verify the authenticity of the
content.

As this hardware can be deployed on an untrusted
platform, it must be protected from modification.
Anti-tamper methods, such as tamper evident packaging must be utilized to protect the Trusted Signing Hardware from modification. Industry bestpractices must be followed for key distribution and
protection. Theft of a private or secret key would
compromise the ability to know the origin of a piece
of data. As such, the trusted hardware needs to
employ measures to prevent theft. Some modern
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) support
secure boot and so configuration and keys are stored
unencrypted can can only be decrypted with a Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF) derived encryption
key.15 We recommend these sorts of measures for
protecting encryption keys.

In a remote sensing application, it is best to sign the
data as early as possible. The data path (as depicted
in Figure 1) makes up a broad attack service. However, a digital signature can protect the image from
unauthorized modification and secures portion of the
data path and attack surface that falls between the
generation of the signature and verification by the
end user. For this reason, we sign the data as close
to the analog to digital conversion as possible (see
Figure 3).
Our approach is for the Trusted Signing Hardware to
subsume the responsibility for reading the raw frame
off of the focal plane array (FPA). It also gathers
time, location, orientation, and other metadata and
generates a digital signature for both the image content and the metadata. Two of the hard problems
associated with authenticated cameras are binding
time and location to an image.6 The hardware package must provide an independent time source and an
independent sensor for providing location and orienCrosby

Performing the image signing in an isolated FPGA
reduces the risk of compromise. This is similar to
an approach taken by researchers working in participatory sensing,16 who have identified solutions
for enabling trust of crowdsourced data from mobile phones and other Internet of Things (IoT) devices.17, 18 Many of the proposed techniques depend
on each device having a root-of-trust established
in trusted hardware and software, such as Arm’s
TrustZone19 or other Trusted Execution Environ5
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Figure 4: The architecture of the Trusted Signing Hardware
could result in a duplicate digital signature. Currently, the key sizes selected meet or exceed the minimum recommended sizes in the CNSA standard.20
As an additional protection and to ensure no images
are omitted when receiving a continuous sequence of
collects, we suggest including the hash of the previous image in the metadata for the following image
to establish a chain of hashes. The availability of
this linked list will enable end users to detect issues
by locating gaps or forks in the linked list of hashes,
and identify potentially missing data.

ment (TEE) technology. Modern computers perform some of their most critical operations in TEEs.
A TEE protects operations from application-level
threats living on the same physical machine. The
use of such hardware can enable the secure generation of data on third-party platforms, given that
the data is digitally signed or otherwise encrypted
before leaving the secure space.
As size, weight, and power (SWaP) is an ever present
concern for satellite missions, the form factor and
specific anti-tamper techniques utilized will need to
be crafted for each satellite. As FPAs are generally implemented as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), there is an opportunity to integrate the signing logic into the FPA’s ASIC. This
could save space and power, though the independent
time source and location sensor and its connection
to the ASIC would still need to be protected.

Other challenges will need to be addressed on a
platform-by-platform basis, including the power usage required by encryption algorithms,21 identification of image modifications required by commercial
imagery providers, and design of interfaces and protocols between the Trusted Signing Hardware and
the onboard processor.22 The trusted hardware
must interface with the FPA and the untrusted onboard processor. Great care must be taken to limit
interfaces and protocols to the required set of operations.

Once an image is digitally signed, it cannot be modified without detection. A digital signature is created
by hashing the data with a hash function and then
encrypting the hash with symmetric or asymmetric
encryption. Our current prototype uses SHA-3-384
as the hash function and RSA-4096 as the asymmetric encryption algorithm. However, raw satellite
imagery typically needs to undergo correction (such
as radiometric correction and orthorectification) and
enhancement (such as geocorrelation) prior to being
useful to non-expert end users. These actions could
be performed onboard, within the Trusted Signing
Hardware, prior to generating the digital signature.
Otherwise, the modification would need to be performed downstream by the end user or by a system
trusted by the end user.

Inspection Plan
Securely deploying trusted hardware on an untrusted payload poses many challenges, especially
when the satellite engineers and integrators are
themselves untrusted. The anti-tamper controls
mentioned in the last section protect the hardware
and keys from certain types of threats. However,
given sufficient access and enough time, they can be
defeated. As such, additional process is required to
protect these mechanisms. For pre-launch protection for production units, we recommend the following actions:

Theoretically, a hash collision could be found which
Crosby
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1. Provide representative test units for satellite
developers to use for design and test.

Requirements checked: Time, orientation, origin, content
Description: The trust attributes of image product
are to be checked upon receipt. Consistently checking each product provides a consistent view of clock
and IMU readings which can reveal a compromise
of the clock or the IMU sensor within the Trusted
Signing Hardware. The digital signature should be
checked for every image using the public key of the
Trusted Signing Hardware that signed the image.

2. Manufacture the Trusted Signing Hardware in
a trusted facility.
3. Limit the amount of time the third-party has
unsupervised access to the Trusted Signing
Hardware.
4. Review designs and visually inspect the satellite to ensure that nothing sits between the
FPA and the Trusted Signing Hardware. Ensure that the communication lines can not be
reconfigured post launch.

The clock reading should be monotonic. If the timestamp ever moves backward, then this indicates tampering or an update to the time. The IMU sensor reading should be evaluated to ensure that it
matches the off-nadir angle reported elsewhere in the
image.

5. Inspect the Trusted Signing Hardware for tampering at all key points during integration, especially before it is placed into a compartment
that reduces visibility. Use seals when appropriate.

Finally, each image will include the hash of the previous image in its metadata. This chaining forms
a linked list of hashes that should be checked. The
chain can be broken by lost images or by receiving
an image that was signed by a leaked private key.
This check is important in detecting leaked private
keys.

6. Burn-in the encryption keys into non-volatile
memory as close to launch as possible.
7. Retrieve and inspect all test and otherwise unlaunched units for tampering.
Once the satellite is launched, access to the payload
becomes much harder and ongoing physical inspection is not required. Tamper events must still be
reported to operators and end users.

Verification Routine: Challenge/Response Test
Frequency: Post-launch then at regular intervals
during the life of the payload
Requirements checked: Time, location, view,
and origin
Description: Using a trusted radio frequency antenna, communicate with the satellite directly to
have a message encrypted. The ground operator
generates a nonce (a one time message, such as a
random number) and transmits it to the satellite
over commanding channels with a request to have
it timestamped and encrypted by the Trusted Signing Hardware. The satellite receives the request and
forwards it on to the Trusted Signing Hardware.
The Trusted Signing Hardware collects the received
nonce, the current time, the IMU reading, and the
presence of any tamper events into a package and
encrypts it with the private key. The encrypted content is then returned to the satellite processor and
then downlinked to the ground operator.

Verification Routines
Additional actions are required to verify the proper
deployment of the Trusted Signing Hardware to orbit and the proper function of the hardware. All
three of the following routines are required:
In addition to these two tests, ongoing inspection of
data products is required. While it is theoretically
possible to find a hash collision with SHA-384 or to
attack the encryption of a single record, it is challenging and computationally infeasible to do this on
an ongoing basis. For this reason, we provide the
hash from the previous image in the metadata for
each image. This creates a chain of trust that can
be checked, even by a standard user. Other ongoing
tests include ensuring that the timestamp is monotonic in that it never is earlier than the timestamp
of the previous data record and checking IMU readings against the expected look angle for the reported
imaging position in orbit.

When the response is received, it is decrypted using the Trusted Signing Hardware’s public key. The
ground operator ensures that the returned nonce
matches the one that was sent, that the returned
timestamp is correct, and that the IMU reading reports a space environment. The presence of any tamper events is noted. This test is important for checking the timestamp because the operator can bound

Verification Routine: Image Product Verification
Frequency: Upon receipt of each image
Crosby
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the expected round-trip time using the distance to
the satellite and the expected time for processing
the request. If a response is unduly delayed, then
the test fails. This test ensures that the private key
is located at a specific place in the sky and that the
clock has not been tampered with. The time bounds
must be tight enough so that the satellite would not
have time to defer the request to a neighboring satellite or a ground station where the Trusted Signing
Hardware is actually located. An untrusted ground
station should not be used for this test, as it could
redirect the request to a different antenna or to the
Trusted Signing Hardware that was retained on the
ground. This test is depicted in Figure 5.

comes available, it will be checked using the standard
steps for image product verification. The test operator then attempts to detect and extract the signal
from the message. This can be done by the geospatial coordinates of the emitter at the time of the test
or by searching for the signal in the image. The location, color, and intensity of the signal in the image
are noted. The ground operator then looks in the
emitter log for the signal attributes at the time the
image was taken. If the signal matches, then the test
passes. If the signal is missing or if the attributes do
not match, then the test fails. Failures could be the
result of unsynchronized clocks, poor geolocation, or
poor pointing of the emitter. This test is depicted
in Figure 6.

Capture
Nonce
signal

Nonce

Signed
image

Timestamped
and encrypted nonce

Extract
and verify

Figure 5: The messaging between a trusted
ground station and the Trusted Signing Hardware for the challenge response test

Nonce
log

Verification Routine: Emitter Test
Frequency: Post-launch then at regular intervals
during the life of the payload
Requirements checked: Check location, orientation, view, origin, and content
Description: A ground-based optical signal is directed at the satellite hosting the Trusted Signing
Hardware. This signal ultimately represent a nonce
and that can be done by varying the signal’s color,
intensity, and/or location. Multiple optical emitters can also be used within the satellites field of
view to increase the amount of information transmitted. The signals color, intensity, location, and
emission time are logged. The diameter of the signal should be limited to reduce the chances of interception by unintended viewing satellites. For testing with satellites in non-geosynchronous, the signal
emitter should be on a motorized mount that can
track the satellite. This test must be performed at a
time that the satellite will be imaging. This can be
done by tasking the satellite to collect at a particular place and time or by calculating when and where
the satellite will be collecting.

Figure 6: Component interactions in the
emitter test

When imagery from the time period of the test be-

The risk of the integrity box being compromised or

Crosby

This test is important because it verifies that the
imaging sensor had a real, unobstructed view of the
ground. This test can be performed passively if the
collection schedule is known or if tasking is submitted through an unattributed account. This test also
confirms the location and orientation of the satellite
by the sheer fact that the satellite was able to see
the directed signal.
This test has similarity with Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR)23 in that a signal is transmitted from the
ground to the satellite. The difference is that instead
of using a reflector on the surface of the satellite to
return the signal to Earth, the return signal returns
in the data stream. Since the return signal is digitally signed in the data stream, we sometimes call
this test ”Verifiable Satellite Ranging” or VSR. The
signal does not have to be a light, but could be an
object visible from space. Historically, objects like
these used for communication are called optical telegraphs.24
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Table 1: Summary of how the trust requirements are covered by the four classes of protections
Trust
Requirement
Time

Potential
Threats
Replay attack,
time falsification

Architecture
Properties
Independent
time source

Anti-tamper
Measures
Anti-tamper
packaging

Inspection
Processes
Access restriction, package
check

Location

Not deployed/operated elsewhere
Looking in
wrong direction
Fake inputs,
Blocked view

Independent
IMU - space
environment
Independent
IMU - attitude

Anti-tamper
packaging

-

Origin

Private key
leak, falsification of origin

Private signing
key

Restricted interfaces and
connections
Protect private key with
secure boot

Access restriction, package
check
Access restriction, package
check
Check connection to FPA

Content

Private key
leak, falsification of content

Private signing
key, chain of
hashes

Orientation

View

Anti-tamper
packaging

Protect private key with
secure boot

tampered with drops significantly once it is fielded
in a space environment. The majority of the protections we have architected are focused on confirming that the device was fielded to the correct orbit, and that it was not modified or compromised
before launch. This necessitates aggressive antitamper protections as well as inspections to verify
no tamper-events occurred.

Access restriction, package
check

Challenge/
response test,
emitter test,
image product
verification
Challenge/
response test,
emitter test,
image product
verification

clude running image processing routines inside the
Trusted Signing Hardware or deferring them to the
end user. Finally, if the host satellite doesn’t communicate challenge/response test requests and responses in a timely manner, we will be unable to
accurately validate the clock. In this case, checking
that timestamps are monotonically increasing in image product verification will buy down risk of clock
tampering.

As with any authenticated camera, ours must be
checked for proper function. These tests must take
place once the satellite is delivered on orbit and can
be performed on a routine basis after that.

Solution Summary

Limitations

Our approach addresses the six trust requirements
for imagery by utilizing trusted hardware to capture the image and the collection time, location,
and orientation. The hardware is protected by antitamper mechanisms and pre-launch controls and inspections. Post launch, the hardware is routinely
checked at its expected location for proper function.
These safety measures enable end users to verify the
image products they receive. Table 1 provides a
summary of these protections.

While our approach is the most advanced we know
of, it does have some potential weaknesses. First,
physical access to a launched satellite or the ability
to remotely reconfigure the connection between the
FPA and the Trusted Signing Hardware, can violate
trust requirement 4 (view). Second, digitally signed
imagery cannot be modified for any reason, including standard image reconstruction and enhancement
pipelines processing, without invalidating the previously computed digital signature. Solutions inCrosby

Access restriction, package
check

Verification
Routines
Challenge/
response test,
image product
verification
Challenge/
response test,
emitter test
Emitter test,
image product
verification
Emitter test
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PATH FORWARD
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We have started investigating approaches for verifying the outputs of image processing algorithms
executed at untrusted ground stations.25 Our next
steps include looking into secure multi-party computation to enable processing imagery without impacting the validity of a digital signature.

Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the
views of the U.S. DOE or the United States Government.

The techniques in this paper may also apply to other
remote sensing modalities, including Radio Frequency (RF) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).
We reserve those as future work.
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